Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox

The Monist 89 (1):178 - 202 (2006)
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Abstract

My task here is the first one. I do present a consistent formal system and claim that it provides a perfect model of natural languages such as English, but this system involves no surprises. It is none other than the standard framework of classical logic and model theory. The real weight of the argument lies in the claim that the classical framework—without alteration or addition—contains the resources to model what happens when we say in English ‘This sentence is not true’.

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2009-01-28

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Nicholas J. J. Smith
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

Radical Anti‐Disquotationalism.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):41-107.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
Vagueness as closeness.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):157 – 183.
Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp 23 (sup1):211--50.

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