Skepticism about Meaning, Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):211-249 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein both present “skeptical” arguments for the conclusion that there are no facts about meaning. In each case the argument for the conclusion is that if there are facts about meaning, then they must be determined by some more fundamental facts, but facts about meaning are not determined by any such facts. Consequently there are no facts about meanings. Within this overall framework, Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein differ substantially — both in their reasons for thinking that facts about meaning are not determined by other facts, and in their responses to the alleged elimination of these facts. Despite this, I believe that their arguments fail for essentially the same reason; each equivocates about what it means for one set of facts to determine another. Once the equivocation is eliminated, the arguments lose their plausibility.

Other Versions

reprint Soames, Scott (1998) "Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp 23(sup1):211--50

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 98,459

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-30

Downloads
133 (#147,178)

6 months
14 (#187,782)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Scott Soames
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics.Peter Ludlow - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Logical Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):47-81.
The normativity of content and 'the Frege point'.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):405-415.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.

Add more references