The Lessons of the Liar

Theory and Decision 11 (1):55-70 (1979)
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Abstract

The paper argues that the liar paradox teaches us these lessons about English. First, the paradox-yielding sentence is a sentence of English that is neither true nor false in English. Second, there is no English name for any such thing as a set of all and only true sentences of English. Third, ‘is true in English’ does not satisfy the axiom of comprehension.

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Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)

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References found in this work

The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Toward a solution to the liar paradox.Robert L. Martin - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (3):279-311.
On grelling's paradox.Robert L. Martin - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (3):321-331.
On a puzzling classical validity.Robert L. Martin - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):454-473.

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