Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)
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| Abstract |
In this paper I defend the claim that justification is closed under conjunction, and confront its most alarming consequence – that one can have justification for believing propositions that are unlikely to be true, given one’s evidence.
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| Keywords | Justification Belief Conjunction Closure Single Premise Closure Risk Aggregation |
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
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