Closure and Epistemic Modals

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22 (2018)
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Abstract

According to a popular closure principle for epistemic justification, if one is justified in believing each of the premises in set Φ and one comes to believe that ψ on the basis of competently deducing ψ from Φ—while retaining justified beliefs in the premises—then one is justified in believing that ψ. This principle is prima facie compelling; it seems to capture the sense in which competent deduction is an epistemically secure means to extend belief. However, even the single-premise version of this closure principle is in conflict with certain seemingly good inferences involving the epistemic possibility modal ♢. According to other compelling principles concerning competent deduction and epistemic justification, one can competently infer ¬♢φ from ¬φ in deliberation even though there are cases in which one can justifiably believe ¬φ but would be unjustified in believing ¬♢φ. Thus, as we argue, philosophers must choose between unrestricted closure for justification and the validity of these other principles.

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Author Profiles

Tamar Lando
Columbia University
Justin Bledin
Johns Hopkins University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Multilateral Logic.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):505-536.
Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.

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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

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