Belief as Commitment to the Truth

In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this essay, I develop an account of belief as commitment to the truth of a proposition. On my account, to believe p is to represent p as true by way of committing to the truth of p. To commit to the truth of p, in the sense I am interested in, is to exercise the normative power to subject one’s representation of p as true to the normative standard of truth. As I argue, my account of belief as commitment of the truth explains a variety of features of belief that separate it from attitudes like acceptance, supposition, and imagination. Most importantly, it explains the distinctive connection between belief and evidence. Moreover, my account helps solve three further puzzles about belief, regarding doxastic voluntarism, the aim of belief, and Moore’s paradox.

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Keshav Singh
University of Alabama, Birmingham

Citations of this work

Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasons and belief.Daniel Fogal - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):323-348.
Suspended Judgement Rebooted.Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Logos and Episteme (4):445-462.

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References found in this work

The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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