Abstract

This thesis is a study of anti-realism as formulated by Michael Dummett. I defend the basic idea of Dummett's anti-realism: the claim that our epistemological limitations impose constraints on theories of meaning which undermine the semantic justification of classical logic. I reject much of the rest of Dummett's views. For example, I reject the contention that theories of meaning should be formulated with a single basic concept which is epistemological, and I dispute Dummett's arguments against meaning holism. I argue for the value of incorporating a correspondence notion of truth and also pragmatic roles into anti-realist semantics, and defend an at least moderate holism. ;Considerable attention is given to examining the work of figures who are major influences on Dummett. In Chapter 1 I introduce and defend elements of anti-realism as they appear in Brouwer's Intuitionism. In Chapter 2 I discuss Dummett's own work, defending the basic idea of his anti-realism against a number of recent critics. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the work of Wittgenstein and Quine respectively. I explore the theme of verificationism as it appears in their writings, and argue that their ideas do not defeat the possibility of a theory of meaning and provide support for logical revisionism. In the fifth and final chapter I sketch a two-factor approach to semantics which is compatible with anti-realism, and in the final section of this chapter argue in defense of anti-realism