Abstract

Since Donald Davidson published 'Truth and Meaning' in 1967 and a series of papers afterward, his theory of meaning has been one most widely discussed. Davidson claims that a theory of truth in the style of Tarski constitutes the core of a satisfactory theory of meaning. This claim is based on the belief that the meaning of a sentence is given when its truth condition is specified. ;The significant objections against this theory have come from the anti-realist arguments of Michael Dummett. He criticizes a Davidsonian theory of meaning from two directions: the notion of truth does not work as the central notion of a theory of meaning; holism is wrong as a conception of language. ;In my dissertation, I attempt to defend Davidson's theory by arguing against both and . ;In Chapter 1, I present the basic tenets of Davidson's theory of meaning, most importantly the thesis that the truth condition of a sentence yields its meaning; and I try to show how the theory works. ;In Chapter 2, I discuss a way of conceiving a Davidson's theory of meaning: how it can derive the speaker's understanding of sentences. This brings out the discussions of an interpretation of Davidson's holism given by Dummett. ;In Chapter 3, I consider Dummett's anti-realist arguments against Davidson's theory of meaning, in particular, from the intuitionist viewpoint. ;In Chapter 4, I discuss responses from some philosophers which were intended to counter Dummett's anti-realist attack. And then I offer my own response. ;Chapter 5 consists of the conclusive remarks. I compare Dummett's views on a theory of meaning and related matters with Davidson's views on truth, knowledge and meaning. I finally state some observations of mine on the views