Abstract

The issue of realism has been with us, in various forms, since at least the time of Plato. The dispute between realists and their opponents is currently attracting a considerable amount of attention in the philosophical community. However, there is often a lack of clarity in discussions of the dispute. This is due, in part, to the many ways in which the dispute and the positions involved are characterized. ;The dissertation seeks to understand the precise nature of the dispute between those who support realism and those who oppose it, by an examination of several of the more prominent characterizations of realism which have been offered. These include those characterizations offered by W. T. Stace, Michael Dummett, Michael Devitt and Hilary Putnam. Particular emphasis is given the characterization of realism as a semantic thesis by Dummett, and the relationship of this characterization both to more traditional characterizations of realism, and to recent characterizations of realism as a general, scientific thesis. A way of seeing the relationships of the various characterizations to one another, and of seeing just what is in dispute between realists and their opponents, is offered. ;Another aim of the dissertation is to determine whether a solution to the dispute is possible. To this end, several recent arguments against realism, offered by Dummett and Putnam, are examined. These recent arguments have been thought by some to constitute a new challenge to realism. I argue that, while these arguments do point to problematic features of realism, none of them is conclusive. After I evaluate these most recent arguments, I assess the status of realist positions with regard to anti-realist positions. I argue that both realism and anti-realism face severe difficulties, for which solutions seem unlikely. The problems facing realism tend to force one toward anti-realism, and vice versa. One result of this is that both realists and anti-realists seem pushed toward a form of Kantian idealism. I consider the sort of solution which would be required to settle the issue between realists and anti-realists, and conclude that it is unlikely that there is a rational solution to the dispute.