Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

What is token physicalism?Noa Latham - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
Should property-dualists be substance-hylomorphists?Gordon Barnes - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.
Why I am not a dualist.Karen Bennett - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:208-231.
Difficulties with physicalism, and a programme for dualists.Peter Forrest - 1996 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
Property dualism without substance dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.Penelope Mackie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
How Does an Aristotelian Substance Have its Platonic Properties? Issues and Options.Paul Gould - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):343-364.
Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to Strawson.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):72-89.
Review of The Evolution of the Soul (2005). [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - 2005 - The Secular Web.
Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions.Andrew Melnyk - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):381-407.
Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
Part-whole physicalism and mental causation.Douglas Ehring - 2003 - Synthese 136 (3):359-388.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-11-18

Downloads
278 (#72,555)

6 months
44 (#94,194)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Susan Schneider
Florida Atlantic University

Citations of this work

Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Material through and through.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450.
Must strong emergence collapse?Umut Baysan & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophica 91 (1):49--104.
Property dualists shouldn't be nominalists about properties.Daniel Giberman & David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
An essay concerning human understanding.John Locke - 1689 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Pauline Phemister.
Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.

View all 31 references / Add more references