Material through and through

Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450 (2020)
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Abstract

Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.

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Andrew M. Bailey
Yale-NUS College

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References found in this work

Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
The structure of objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - New York: Routledge.
The Possibility of Physicalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):557-592.

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