Authors
Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam
Julian J. Schlöder
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts, which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize the axioms of the minimalist theory. Sten Lindström and Tim Button have independently argued that Horwich’s attempt to formulate minimalism remains unsuccessful. We show how to properly state Horwich’s axioms by appealing to propositional functions that are given by definite descriptions. Both Lindström and Button discuss proposals similar to ours and conclude that they are unsuccessful. Our new suggestion avoids these objections.
Keywords truth  minimalism  deflationism  propositions  axioms  Horwich
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Horwich's Way Out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.
What Do We Use “Truth” For: Criticizing Horwich’s Minimalism.Junpei Harada - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 53:65-69.
Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory.Jay Newhard - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):61 - 86.
Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW]Dirk Greimann - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
A Minimalist Theory of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):53-57.
Truth -- Meaning -- Reality.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Horwich and the Generalization Problem.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2004 - Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium:187-189.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-08-31

Total views
118 ( #98,024 of 2,499,865 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #21,491 of 2,499,865 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes