Minimalism and the Facts About Truth
In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth? (2002)
AbstractMinimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate explanation —a move that deprives it from giving support to Minimalism. At the heart of Minimalism lies a theory of truth for propositions. It is called the minimal theory, or MT for short. It consists of a collection of axioms. Each axiom is a proposition of the form..
Similar books and articles
The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns.Glen Hoffmann - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory.Jay Newhard - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):61 - 86.
Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW]Dirk Greimann - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Minimalism About Truth.Richard Holton - 1993 - In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.
On Creeping Minimalism and the Nature of Minimal Entities.Luca Moretti - 2009 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality (Routledge).
Czy minimalizm w teorii prawdy prowadzi do relatywizmu?Aleksandra Derra-Włochowicz - 2003 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism About Truth-Aptness?Massimiliano Vignolo - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98.
Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):491 - 512.
How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists.Huw Price - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.
Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Marian David - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
Quine's Ladder: Two and a Half Pages From the Philosophy of Logic.Marian David - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):274-312.
References found in this work
No references found.