Minimalism and the Facts About Truth

In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth? (2002)
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Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate explanation —a move that deprives it from giving support to Minimalism. At the heart of Minimalism lies a theory of truth for propositions. It is called the minimal theory, or MT for short. It consists of a collection of axioms. Each axiom is a proposition of the form..



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Marian David
University of Graz

Citations of this work

Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory D. Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.
Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
Don't forget about the correspondence theory of truth.Marian David - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
Truth, explanation, minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987–1009.

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