Horwich and the Generalization Problem

Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium:187-189 (2004)
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Abstract

In order to be complete, Horwich’s minimalist theory must be able to deal with generalizations about truth. A logical and an epistemic-explanatory level of the generalization problem are distinguished, and Horwich’s responses to both sides of the problem are examined. Finally some persistent problems for minimalism are pointed out.

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