Authors
Dirk Greimann
Universidade Federal Fluminense
Abstract
This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions. The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a proposition to be true.
Keywords truth  minimalism  deflationism  Horwich  Davidson
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1008379518681
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,172
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
A Realist Conception of Truth.William P. Alston - 2018 - Cornell University Press.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
Truth, Explanation, Minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987–1009.
Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Minimalism and the Value of Truth.By Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517.
Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
A Thick Realist Consequence of Wright's Minimalism.Luca Moretti - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):24–38.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
On Horwich's Way Out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.
Minimalism About Truth.Richard Holton - 1993 - In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
79 ( #148,029 of 2,517,885 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #409,482 of 2,517,885 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes