Abstract

One of the most influential and controversial of Immanuel Kant's ideas was his concept of the thing-in-itself . In this study I examine the issue of the thing-in-itself as it was interpreted, appropriated, and critiqued by Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. I demonstrate that this is a problem that goes to the core of the philosophical relationship between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. I argue that some of Nietzsche's most renowned ideas, such as his "perspectivism" and the "will to power," are directly tied to his understanding and evaluation of Schopenhauer's conception of the thing-in-itself as metaphysical will. ;In light of Schopenhauer's conception of the thing-in-itself, I examine the genesis and development of Nietzsche's critique of this concept. Though it is the case that in his mature works Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer's conception of the thing-in-itself as will, I demonstrate that Nietzsche's position on this issue was not as divergent from Schopenhauer's as one might expect. I show, for instance, that Schopenhauer anticipated Nietzsche's rejection of transcendent metaphysics. Also, though Nietzsche's "perspectivism" was directly tied to his rejection of the thing-in-itself, I argue that it was a position that in some important ways was anticipated by, and remained indebted to, Schopenhauer. Finally, I examine Nietzsche's theory of fictions in relation to his critique of the thing-in-itself and Schopenhauer's pessimistic metaphysics