Abstract

This dissertation traces Nietzsche's career-long confrontation with Schopenhauer with the purpose of clarifying Nietzsche's basic philosophic question: how is affirmation possible in an age of nihilism? Moreover, it seeks to identify the significance of this question for political philosophy and for modern politics. Contrary to the accepted view of scholars that Nietzsche "broke" with Schopenhauer after the 1870's, I show that by invoking the problem of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche advanced and refined his own questions throughout his career. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer represents the fate of post-Platonic philosophy. Nietzsche finds the beginning of his own inquiry in Schopenhauer's question of the value of existence and in his honest atheism. Nietzsche rejects from the outset, however, Schopenhauer's answer of will-denial or resignationism. Nietzsche, therefore, intensifies pessimism with the intention of finding--in the depths of the most extreme nihilism--the most extreme affirmation. His efforts to break free from Schopenhauer include the abandonment of the metaphysical or contemplative perspective, the deepening of weak pessimism into strong pessimism, and the attempt to complete nihilism in the thought of the eternal return of the same. I argue that Nietzsche never completes his effort to overturn modernity by defining affirmation in the form of future philosophy. For this reason, Nietzsche's rejection of modern political philosophy and modern politics remains unjustified on his own terms. Instead, his uncovering of the peak of modernity provides sharp and insightful criticism necessary for the supporters of modern politics to consider