Assertion and belief

Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78 (1966)
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Abstract

This paper is written in opposition of various antecedent discussions of Moore’s paradox. It concludes that one cannot make an honest and primary truth-claim by producing ‘p, but I believe not-p’.

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10.1007/bf00398599

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Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Sayward on assertion and belief.Robert A. Imlay - 1968 - Philosophical Studies 19 (5):76 - 79.

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References found in this work

A Note on Saying and Disbelieving.Max Deutscher - 1965 - Analysis 25 (3):53 - 57.
A solution to Moore's paradox.Lennart Åqvist - 1964 - Philosophical Studies 15 (1-2):1 - 5.

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