More on assertion and belief

Philosophical Studies 22 (1-2):20 - 24 (1971)
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Abstract

In an earlier paper Sayward argued that a speaker could not make an assertion by uttering a sentence of form “p, but I believe not-p” given that the speaker spoke honestly and literally. Robert Imlay criticized some things said in that earlier paper. This paper responds to those criticisms.

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10.1007/bf00355577

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Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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