More on assertion and belief
Philosophical Studies 22 (1-2):20 - 24 (1971)
Abstract
In an earlier paper Sayward argued that a speaker could not make an assertion by uttering a sentence of form “p, but I believe not-p” given that the speaker spoke honestly and literally. Robert Imlay criticized some things said in that earlier paper. This paper responds to those criticisms.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/bf00355577
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