Sayward on assertion and belief

Philosophical Studies 19 (5):76 - 79 (1968)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to criticize sayward's contention that "p, But I believe not-P" cannot be used to make an assertion. It is not only not clear what sayward takes an assertion to be but the most he can be said to have shown is that a dishonest truth claim cannot be an honest assertion. In order to show that "p but I believe not-P" cannot be used to make an honest truth claim he is forced to make the assumption that "i believe that I believe not-P" entails "i believe not-P."

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Assertion and Belief.Charles Sayward - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.

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