Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief

Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief

Similar books and articles

Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Conscious belief.D. H. Mellor - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:87-101.
Assertion and belief.Charles Sayward - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.
Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Moore's many paradoxes.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-03-03

Downloads
317 (#37,438)

6 months
57 (#22,326)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

References found in this work

The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500-503.

View all 9 references / Add more references