Animalism, Abortion, and a Future Like Ours

The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):317-332 (2019)
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Abstract

Marquis’ future-like-ours argument against the morality of abortion assumes animalism—a family of theories according to which we are animals. Such an assumption is theoretically useful for various reasons, e.g., because it provides the theoretical underpinning for a reply to the contraception-abstinence objection. However, the connection between the future-like-ours argument and one popular version of animalism can prove lethal to the former, or so I argue in this paper.

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10.1007/s10892-019-09298-y

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Andrea Sauchelli
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):701-708.
Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.

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