The future‐like‐ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism

Bioethics 32 (3):199-204 (2018)
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Abstract

Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either abandon diachronic universalism or acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.

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Andrea Sauchelli
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

Animalism, Abortion, and a Future Like Ours.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):317-332.

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References found in this work

Persons, Animals, Ourselves.Paul F. Snowdon (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Maximality and microphysical supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
Abortion Revisited.Don Marquis - 2007 - In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press.
Promiscuous Endurantism and Diachronic Vagueness.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):181-189.

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