Abstract

The subject of this paper is the question whether proper names have sense as well as reference. The reference of a name is the object to which this name refers to, whereas the sense of a name is the way that this name re-fers to that object. Various theories have been offered to answer this question. According to J. S. Mill’s account, a proper name is purely referential. According to Gottlob Frege’s descriptivist account, the sense as well as the reference of a proper name can be practically determined by a definite description. Commensurate with the ‘cluster’ account, the sense and the reference of the names can be practically determined by a cluster of descriptions. There is also the causal account of proper names with its variations, which is a kind of return to the Millian account, for which proper names are purely referential. According to the causal account, there must be a causal chain between the name and the object it refers to without neglecting the social aspect of meaning. Though not complete in themselves, these accounts are helpful in order to determine the meaning of proper names.