Abstract

Part II begins by sketching a pragmatic interpretation of the attributive/referential distinction based on the extent and nature of a person's beliefs. The crux of the distinction is seen to be the presence of a relation termed "epistemic privity." The discussion proceeds to extend the pragmatic distinction to propositions and reference across possible worlds. The apparatus thus developed will then be applied to the difficulties of contexts of propositional attitudes. ;A variation on the Single Description Theory is the "Cluster Theory." The main proponents of this view have included Wittgenstein, Strawson and Searle. Cluster theorists deny the Frege-Russell view that names are short for descriptions, but they do argue that the definite descriptions which are associated with names by their users play a crucial role in determining reference for names. Their idea is that though names are not short for descriptions, an object must uniquely satisfy a certain proportion of the descriptions associated with a name in order to be the name's referent. ;In one form or another, Sense Theories, , have dominated the philosophical literature during this century. Recently, however, the Sense Theories have been recognized as artificial as applied to natural languages. This has been due to the proposal of a new causal model for name-reference, a model which has been suggested by Kripke, Devitt, Donnellan and Kaplan. According to the Causal Theory, the relation between a proper name and its referent is not mediated by a sense. Rather, an object is a name-use's referent in virtue of a causal chain of communication linking the use with the object. Sense Theories have the common feature that to be the referent of a name, an object must uniquely satisfy at least one of the properties associated with the name by its users. Causal theories have the common feature that an object is the referent only if the object is uniquely connected by some sort of causal chain to the name-use. ;Part I of the thesis will be concerned with the motivation, exposition and critical examination of the previously mentioned theories of proper names. After an exposition of Donnellan's distinction between attributive and referential uses, the existence of a class of so-called "attributive names" will be noted. The existence of this class will be seen to mitigate the seeming incompatibility between the various theories of proper names. ;Frege and Russell held that typically the referents of proper names are determined in the manner of definite descriptions. Like definite descriptions names express a sense, on this view. The view is that proper names typically have the meanings of definite descriptions, and for someone to understand a name and have the ability to use it to refer, that person must first "grasp" its sense. This is the so-called "Single Description Theory." ;Philosophers who have wished to explain how proper names are linked to their referents have in general attempted to do so on the relatively secure basis of their understanding of definite descriptions and demonstrative pronouns. Thus, Mill and Russell used the model of demonstrative pronouns to describe the way in which proper names refer to objects. These may be termed "No-Sense Theories." ;The general topic to be pursued in this thesis centers on the question of how the referents of ordinary proper names are determined. A major source of difficulty in understanding the mechanism by which proper names refer to objects is the paucity of models from which to approach the problem