The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications

Philosophical Psychology 1:1-20 (2022)
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We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to as “moral judgments”, then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity of moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics.

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Author Profiles

David Sackris
Arapahoe Community College
Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
University of Toronto at Mississauga

Citations of this work

Are there "Moral" Judgments?David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2):(A1)1-24.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.

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