Defusing Counterexamples against Motivational Internalism

Filosofija. Sociologija 27 (1):23-30 (2016)
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Externalists argue that motivation is external to moral judgments on the grounds that people can be unmoved by their moral judgments. I reply that people sometimes act indifferently to their moral considerations not because their moral judgments lack motivation but because their moral judgments are obstructed by rival desires. It appears that the moral motivation wanes while the moral judgments linger. In reality, however, the moral motivation is only made inconspicuous by the motivation of the opposing desires. A moral judgment is subject to obstruction just like an emotive judgment and a gustatory judgment.



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Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology

Citations of this work

Replies to Healey’s Comments Regarding van Fraassen’s Positions.Seungbae Park - 2020 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (1):38-47.
A New Indifference Argument against Motivational Internalism.Zhang Wan - 2017 - 4th BEIJING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE.

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References found in this work

Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.

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