Emotion Review 3 (3):274-275 (2011)

Aside from adducing little data that bear on our original concerns (pervasive “audience effects” in the encoding of identifiable “disgust expressions”/lack of morally induced disgust versus moral disgust differentiation), Chapman and Anderson (2011) fail to muster a convincing body of evidence for the founding premise of their empirical endeavor—disgust is a bona fide “basic emotion” whose theoretically predicted FM pattern is a goosebump-like, metaphor-resistant readout capable of being effectively analyzed within the “expression programs” canon, leading us to reaffirm that our favored alternative, the “moral disgust as a metaphor” interpretation, is as consistent with all the pertinent data (including theirs), if not more so
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DOI 10.1177/1754073911402402
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You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust.Iskra Fileva - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):19-33.
Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu.Joshua D. Greene - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.

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