Animals as reflexive thinkers: The aponoian paradigm

In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. Oxford University Press. pp. 319-341 (2017)
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Abstract

The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive thought is required in this pervasive way and holds that supposing that it is derives from a tendency among philosophers and scientists toward overcomplication. Against this tendency, it recommends an aponoian framework, from apó, “away from” and noûs, “intelligence” or “thought,” arguing that seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as complex as they seem, and do not require the ability to engage in reflexive thought.

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Author Profiles

Mark Rowlands
University of Miami
Susana Monsó
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Citations of this work

Morality without mindreading.Susana Monsó - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):338-357.

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References found in this work

Rational animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.
Thought and talk.Donald Davidson - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan & Samuel Guttenplan (eds.), Mind and Language. Clarendon Press. pp. 1975--7.
Can Animals Be Moral?Mark Rowlands - 2012 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
Rational Animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-327.

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