Experience, awareness, and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach [Book Review]

Foundations of Science 5 (4):429-456 (2000)
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Abstract

It is argued that the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. the fact that we have experience, stems from a conceptual confusion between consciousness and experience. It is concluded that experience has to be considered as a basic characteristic of ongoing interactions at even the most simple level, while consciousness is better defined as reflexive awareness, possible since symbolic language was developed. A dynamic evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can be defined as a characteristic linked closely to specific pattern matching, a characteristic which is already apparent at the molecular level at least. Awareness then can be regarded as the special experience of one or more central, final modules in the animal neuronal brain. From evolutionary considerations, awareness can be understood functionally and physiologically. As such, awareness is what experience is to animals. Finally, consciousness could be defined as reflexive awareness, instead of using the term as synonymous to awareness. The ability for reflexive awareness is distinctly different from animal and human awareness and depends upon the availability of a separate frame of reference, as provided by symbolic language. As such, words have made reflexive awareness - a specific and infrequent form of awareness - possible. Conciousness might be defined as the experience evoked by considering, i.e. thinking about experiences themselves. Explaining and understanding awareness and consciousness as evolved biological characteristics of the functioning of animals and later humans, poses no philosophical problems. The nature of experience itself remains elusive, but this is not a problem specific toawareness or consciousness. If there is a hard problem of explaining consciousness, than this actually must be considered as the hard problem of explaining experience. While the definition of experience could be broadened to include all molecular and biological pattern specific recognition events, the true nature of consciousness might be better understood when considering it as a very specific form of awareness, made possible by language.

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Mario Vaneechoutte
Ghent University

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