Reason explanation and the second-person perspective

Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):346-357 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

On a widely held view, the canonical way to make sense of intentional actions is to invoke the agent's ‘motivating reasons’, where the claim that X did A for some ‘motivating reason’ is taken to be neutral on whether X had a normative reason to do A. In this paper, I explore a challenge to this view, drawing on Anscombe's ‘second-personal’ approach to the nature of action explanation.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1080/13869795.2014.946954

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,881

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons.Dustin Locke - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52:215-232.
Reasons and impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Reason explanation:a first-order normative account.Neil C. Manson - unknown
Internalising practical reasons.Rowland Stout - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):229–243.
Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.
Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.
Reasons and the ambiguity of 'belief'.Maria Alvarez - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.
Beyond Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism.Lilian O’Brien - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):281-295.
Self-Knowledge and the First Person.Cynthia Macdonald - 2004 - In M. Sie, M. Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.
Self-knowledge and the First Person.Cynthia Macdonald - 2004 - In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.
Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.
Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action?Gerald Beaulieu - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):440-450.
Compatibilism, Practical Wisdom, and the Narrative Self: Or If I Had Had My Act Together, I Could Have Done Otherwise.David Jay Demoss - 1987 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
Desires, reasons, and causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Agency and causal explanation.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-08-29

Downloads
92 (#186,128)

6 months
13 (#194,827)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Johannes Roessler
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.Joseph Cunningham - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):673-692.
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):235-257.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

View all 35 references / Add more references