Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395 (2009)

Authors
Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University
Abstract
In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It is not attractive for two reasons: the first being that the BPA lacks the features typical of successful conceptual analyses and the second being that it is unable to deliver on the advantages that its proponents claim for it. While not offering a knock-down technical refutation of the BPA, this paper aims to show that there is little reason to think that the BPA is correct, and that it should therefore be given up as an analysis of final value.
Keywords Buck-Passing  Fitting attitude  Reasons  Value  Wrong kind of reason
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-009-9191-5
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value and Reasons to Favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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