Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535 (2005)
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Abstract

In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be formulated. For example, we can claim that value is a property that provides us with reasons to choose an option that has this property. I argue that none of these four other options can ultimately be defended, and therefore the buck-passing account is the one we ought to accept as the correct one. The case for the buck-passing account becomes even stronger, when we examine the weak points of the most pressing criticism against this account thus far.

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Jussi Suikkanen
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.
The Justification of Associative Duties.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):28-55.
Fitting attitudes and welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.
Ethics and the limits of philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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