Abstract

In this dissertation I present Jurgen Habermas's discourse ethics as a theory of practical reasoning that addresses a number of the shortcomings attributed to Kantian moral theory and its descendants. In this context the following objections are most significant: the neo-Aristotelian/neo-Hegelian charge that deontological approaches unduly detach moral deliberation from its anchors in community tradition and conceptions of the good life, and the ethics of care objection that the Kantian focus on universally valid norms neglects the moral significance of caring for particular persons in concrete situations. ;I argue that the discourse-ethical concept of impartiality contains the systematic resources for remedying such deficits in Kantian moral theory. Part One elaborates the key to this reply: a dialogical principle of universalization that links moral insight with real perspective taking and thereby explodes the monological, subject-centered notion of reason predominant in modern moral theory. This forges an intrinsic link between moral insight and solidarity, which allows for a systematically unified response to the above criticisms. ;In Part Two I show how -governed moral discourse takes real needs, interests and conceptions of the good life into consideration without falling behind the Kantian distinction between moral questions and questions of the good life. In response to Charles Taylor's charge that modern moral theories surreptitiously presuppose constitutive goods, I argue that the good of rational cooperation underlying discourse ethics is not one substantive good among others, but a metavalue without viable alternatives in today's world. ;In Part Three I attempt to situate discourse ethics in more concrete contexts. I show, first, how a discourse-ethical account of application builds a care perspective into moral impartiality. Second, I indicate how discourse ethics is actually practiced in contemporary settings; this raises further questions which suggest that only partly captures the moral intuitions governing real discourse. Nevertheless, the discourse-ethical account of intersubjective moral insight points to a multi-level concept of solidarity capable of systematically integrating aspects of morality that deontological approaches too often neglect