Racist jokes are often funny. And part of this has to do with their racism. Many Polish jokes, for example, may easily be converted into moron jokes but are not at all funny when delivered as such. Consider two answers to ‘What has an I.Q. of 1007’: a nation of morons; or Poland. Similarly, jokes portraying Jews as cheap, Italians as cowards, and Greeks as dishonest may be told as jokes about how skinflints, cowards, or dishonest people get on in (...) the world. But they are less funny as such. As this suggests, racist humor is ‘put down’ humor. We laugh, in part, because we find put-downs funny, sometimes even if they are about us. In many contexts, this tendency is relatively harmless; indeed, within reason, it may be therapeutic to join others in a good laugh at oneself. Why, then, all the commotion about racist humor? (shrink)

It is widely believed that preferential hiring practices inevitably result in hiring less qualified candidates for jobs. Indeed, this follows analytically from some definitions of preferential hiring (e.g. George Sher's). This paper describes several preferential hiring strategies that do not have this consequence. Sher's definition is thus shown to be inadequate and an alternative definition is proposed.

Philosophical accounts of punishment are primarily concerned with punishment by the (or: a) state. More specifically, they attempt to explain why the (a) state may justifiably penalize those who are judged to violate its laws and the conditions under which it is entitled to do so. But any full account of these matters must surely be grounded in an account of the nature and purpose of the state and the justification of state authority. Because they are not so grounded, deterrence (...) and retributive theories are incomplete as they are typically formulated. The intuitions behind these theories can be satisfied in a variety of complete theories, i.e., theories that understand the justification of punishment in relation to the justification of state authority. A consequence of this is that at least some of the intuitions underlying deterrence and retributive theories can be satisfied at the same time by a given theory. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that agreements made in response to coercion are entered into involuntarily for that reason. This paper argues that that supposition is false and that it has generated a good deal of avoidable confusion in the courts and among some legal commentators. Agreements entered into involuntarily of course, have no legal standing. But, on any plausible account of coercion, agreements entered into in response to coercion are an inevitability of social life. To prohibit them would be to (...) prohibit many agreements we ought to and do enforce (e.g. labor agreements entered into under threat of strike). This is not to deny that agreements induced by certain uses of force or certain threats of force have and ought to have no standing. But here it is the type of force or threat that invalidates the agreement, not the use of coercion per se. (shrink)

There is an obvious and important difference between bank loans and typical personal loans, viz., that banks charge interest in order to make a profit. Accordingly, what banks do is more accurately described as selling or renting money than as loaning money. Moreover, it is advantageous to banks misleadingly to describe their activity as loaning. For this assimilates their activity to the case of personal loans and helps to create an impression that banks do us a favor by loaning us (...) money and that we owe them gratitude for so doing. Since these impressions are false, banks ought cease to describe what they do in this way. (shrink)

There is a tension between theory and practice in kant's moral philosophy. On the one hand, The categorical imperative presupposes that no rational agent is intrinsically deserving of more rights or a better life than any other. On the other hand, The categorical imperative requires that we act in certain other regarding ways regardless of how others act in relation to us. I argue that often we cannot act in accordance with this latter practical principle without violating the theoretical egalitarianism (...) it presupposes. And I suggest that this sort of conflict may be characteristic of many moral philosophies in the liberal tradition. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explain the significance of the ideologies — or middle-level normative discourse — described by Kenneth Goodpaster in his paper Business Ethics, Ideology, and the Naturalistic Fallacy. It is argued that the propositions constitutive of this discourse are not invokable moral principles (i.e. principles which generate solutions to actual moral problems). Rather, they are characterizations of the normative contexts in which moral decisions are made. As such, they place limits on the ways in which the abstract moral (...) principles of traditional moral theory may be applied or interpreted in making real-life moral decisions. (shrink)

It has often been held that human beings have worth and dignity because they are rational. But "reason" has meant different things to different philosophers. I argue that given what is meant by reason (practical reason) in economics, Decision theory and much moral philosophy, It is doubtful that rationality entitles a being to any special status at all. Moreover, And more generally, All historical appeals to reason to ground such claims are covert appeals to some more specific set of human (...) capacities. The move from reason to rights, Then, Rests on certain assumptions about the good. (shrink)

Do persons from disadvantaged backgrounds deserve as much blame for their immoral or criminal acts as persons who have had all the advantages? Many liberals feel inclined to say ‘no.’ After all, there is a high correlation between criminal activity and a disadvantaged background; indeed, it might fairly be said that poverty breeds crime. Taken in its most obvious direction, however, this line of argument has dangerous deterministic implications. The price of diminished blame is diminished responsibility. We absolve the disadvantaged (...) by portraying them as persons with a diminished capacity for free action. In the extreme case, we view them as victims of circumstance, utterly unable to act other than they do. Thus is born the demeaning parentalism of the worst sort of liberal social worker.Still, there is something correct in the liberal impulse to deny or diminish blame in at least many of these cases for something like the reason that the liberal offers. The task of this paper is to explain what is right about it. More generally, I want to show how we can take a person’s background into account in judging her for her acts without falling into total or partial determinism. In other words, my task is to establish that diminished blame is compatible with full freedom and responsibility. Roughly, I shall argue that we cannot blame someone for her acts if they are permitted or required by moral conclusions that are rational for someone in her position to reach. (shrink)

In "Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories" (Ethics, 90:191-202, January 1980) David Levy argues against a number of theories of perversion by means of the method of counter-example. This is inappropriate since many familiar accounts are not attempts to provide a "one-over-many" formula for a core of clear cases. Rather, like Levy himself, many understand perversions as "unnatural" or "non-human" actions, i.e. as distortions of human nature. Here there is agreement on the intension of the term. Differences in the (...) extension arise in virtue of the relational character of the meaning. For what counts as a distortion of human nature depends on the paradigm of human nature one endorses. In these cases the appropriate way to decide between competing lists of perversions is to evaluate the competing paradigms of human nature on which they rest. Typically these paradigms embody important value assumptions. (shrink)

Richter begins with a set of counter examples to a position that he acknowledges is not important to me. He goes on to produce counter examples to a position I do not hold. And he concludes by imputing a project to me that I nowhere endorse and by ridiculing that project. Part of his confusion is my fault since what I have done is not entirely consistent with what I claimed to have done. So let me try to clarify and (...) to develop what I take to be valuable in my paper.To begin with, it was not my main intent to offer an account of the ordinary use of the term ‘racist’. Indeed, for reasons that will be dear presently, I now think that the attempt to provide such an account is misguided. Whether I have offered an account of what Richter calls a ‘central use’ depends on what he means by ‘central use.’ Judging from his proposed counter examples, he seems to hold that whatever satisfies the definition of a central use of some expression ‘e’ will be acknowledged by all competent speakers as a case of e.In this sense of ‘central use’ I have not offered an account of a central use of ‘racist’ either. What, then, have I done? (shrink)

It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection to (...) teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through. (shrink)

This accessible and provocative collection of science fiction acquaints readers with cutting-edge gender controversies in moral and political philosophy. By imagining future worlds that defy our most basic assumptions about sex and gender, freedom and equality, and ethical values, the anthology’s authors not only challenge traditional standards of morality and justice, but create bold experiments for testing feminist hypotheses. Selections are grouped under four main themes. Part 1, "Human Nature and Reality," concentrates on whether there is an intrinsic difference between (...) males and females. Here the authors inspect opposing views on five related questions: What does it mean to be human? What are women and men really like? How significant is the reproductive difference? How do we define the concepts of "woman" and "nature"? Why is language important? Part 2, "Dystopias: The Worst of All Possible Worlds," first portrays misogynistic societies uncomfortably familiar to the early 21st-century reader. Chilling stories of future possibilities follow, including worlds where women and men separate into armies to fight a literal war of the sexes. Part 3, "Separatist Utopias: Worlds of Difference," assembles stories that scrutinize both the virtues and vices of separatism, in order to address the questions Why should women want to separate from men? and What would and should these all-female worlds be like? In Part 4, "Androgynous Utopias: Worlds of Equality," the authors create intriguing worlds that anticipate the consequences, good and bad, of perfect sexual equality in education, intelligence, capability, and reproduction. With selections from such noted writers as Octavia Butler, Marion Zimmer Bradley, James Tiptree Jr., and many others, plus chapter introductions, discussion questions, and recommended reading list, this stimulating collection offers fresh insights on troubling issues by weaving controversial utopian and dystopian designs from the separate threads of opposing positions. (shrink)

Responding to my paper Bribery Tom Carson argues that bribe takers violate promisory obligations in a wider range of cases than I acknowledge and insists that bribe taking is prima facie wrong in all contexts. I argue that he is wrong on both counts.