Justice and the Good Life: An Analysis and Defense of a Communicative Theory of Ethics

Dissertation, Boston University (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The central question of this dissertation is whether Habermas's discourse ethics can successfully take account of the kinds of criticisms of Kantian formalism, first raised by Hegel, without at the same time abdicating the universalism of the Kantian conception of justice. Specifically, it considers whether the universality of moral principles can be maintained while recognizing the particularity of our experiences and values. This question is pursued in the context of a discussion raised by contemporary Anglo-American ethicists. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that our notions of the right and the good are derived from a notion of the good life which defines the character of any given community. This would seem to undercut the force of Habermas's quasi-deontological position, which asserts that norms are only legitimated by universally valid criteria. This dissertation maintains that Habermas's theory of moral character accounts for both our historical rootedness and our ability to adopt a universalistic standpoint from which to question and assess our culturally mediated beliefs. When Habermas's position is considered in light of the arguments of critics such as Carol Gilligan, Martha Nussbaum, and Larry Blum, who criticize neo-Kantian tendencies to characterize morality as moral argument and the consequent failure to develop concepts of moral character, moral perception, moral emotion, and moral judgment, it becomes clear that Habermas needs a general moral theory that extends to the private sphere. It is possible to reformulate Habermas's ethical theory so that the distinction between norms and values issues from an ideally regulated discourse that at the same time defines the boundary between public and private. The gap between norms and values also can be bridged by incorporating the notion of symmetrical reciprocity as a meta-norm of discourse, which would ground both principles of justice and a notion of the good without privileging any historically specific vision of the good life

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,998

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references