Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games

Theory and Decision 32 (2):147-164 (1992)
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Correlated strategies as Institutions.Daniel G. M. Arce - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (3):271-285.

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The chain store paradox.Reinhard Selten - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (2):127-159.

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