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Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
Theory and Decision 28 (1):47-71 (1990)
Abstract
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Citations of this work
Finite Horizon Bargaining With Outside Options And Threat Points.Randolph Sloof - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (2):109-142.
Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown.Rami Zwick, Amnon Rapoport & John C. Howard - 1992 - Theory and Decision 32 (3):241-268.
References found in this work
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.John C. Harsanyi - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author.Thomas C. Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.Reinhard Selten - 1975 - International Journal of Game Theory 4:25-55.
Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining.Alvin E. Roth & Michael W. Malouf - 1979 - Psychological Review 86 (6):574-594.
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