1.  55
    Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games.Giovanni Facchini, Freek van Megen, Peter Borm & Stef Tijs - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (2):193-206.
    Games associated with congestion situations à la Rosenthal have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games. Second, we extend Rosenthal's congestion model to an incomplete information setting, and show that the related Bayesian games are potential games and therefore have pure Bayesian equilibria.
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  2.  65
    Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games.Robert van Heumen, Bezalel Peleg, Stef Tijs & Peter Borm - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (2):103-129.
  3.  50
    The P-value for cost sharing in minimum.Stefano Moretti, Rodica Branzei, Henk Norde & Stef Tijs - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):47-61.
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  4.  33
    Risk aversion in n-person bargaining.Hans Peters & Stef Tijs - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (1):47-72.