Repugnance or intransitivity: A repugnant but forced choice

In Torbjörn Tännsjö & Jesper Ryberg (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163–86 (2004)
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Abstract

A set of arguments shows that either the Repugnant Conclusion and its variants are true or the better-than relation isn’t transitive. Which is it? This is the most important question in population ethics. The answer will point the way to Parfit’s elusive Theory X

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Stuart Rachels
University of Alabama

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