In Patrick Hassan (ed.), Schopenhauer's Moral Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 12-30 (2022)
AbstractMore than a century before Anscombe counseled us to jettison concepts such as that of the moral ought, or moral law, Schopenhauer mounted a vigorous attack on such prescriptive moral concepts, particularly as found in Kant. In this chapter I consider the four objections that constitute this attack. According to the first, Kant begs the question by merely assuming that ethics has a prescriptive or legislative-imperative form, when a purely descriptive-explanatory conception such as Schopenhauer’s also presents itself as a possibility. According to the second, Kant’s purportedly philosophical ethics is in fact a theological ethics in disguise, because the moral ought and its prescriptive cousins presuppose a divine lawgiver. According to the third, Kant’s conceptions of the moral law as a law of freedom, and of moral imperatives as categorical or unconditioned, involve him in contradictions. Finally, Schopenhauer objects that there can be no such thing as a moral ought because a binding ought or law must be understood to operate through appeals to self-interest, which stands in opposition to morality. I contend that these last three objections are sound and that the fourth in particular succeeds in confuting the prescriptivist conception of morality.
Similar books and articles
Willingly Disinterested: Altruism in Schopenhauer’s Ethics.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 639-650.
Kant e Schopenhauer sobre a natureza da filosofia moral.Aguinaldo Pavão - 2009 - Dissertatio 30:135-148.
Categorical imperatives, moral requirements, and moral motivation.Xiaomei Yang - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):112–129.
Kant's Conception of Inner Value.Oliver Sensen - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):262-280.
Schopenhauer's Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative.Peter Welsen - 2005 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 61 (3/4):757 - 772.
Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant’s Categorical Imperative?Michael Yudanin - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):595-614.
Schopenhauer's Critique of Kant's Foundation for Morals.Mark Lehman Koontz - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
The education of the categorical imperative.James Scott Johnston - 2006 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 25 (5-6):385-402.
Philosophical Grounding For the Moral Law: In Defense of Kant’s Factum der Vernunft.Daniel Paul Dal Monte - 2019 - Con-Textos Kantianos 9:178-195.
JAK PRZEKONAĆ KANTA DO KŁAMSTWA? APORIE IMPERATYWU KATEGORYCZNEGO.Michał Piekarz - 2015 - Hybris, Revista de FilosofíA (30):[113-131.
Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):293-316.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives.Philippa Foot - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.William Paley & Robert Faulder - 1785 - Printed for R. Faulder.