The paper examines fine criticisms schopenhauer makes of kant's ethics: (1) it makes the moral life too intellectual (2) he attempts to base morality on rationality or failure (3) the notion of a "categorical" imperative is unintelligible (4) kant's ethics is in fact endaemonic and his moral theology circular (5) universalisability commits kant to psychological egoism. schopenhauer is agreed with on (1) and (2), otherwise rejected.

By the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Presenting a sustained critique of moral theory from Kant onwards, Williams reorients ethical theory towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy (...) and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a new commentary on the text by A.W.Moore and a foreword by Jonathan Lear. (shrink)

I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to suppose that at least many animals can (...) be wronged and thus, by extension, have rights. The result, I argue, is a perspective on the nature of moral rights in general, and the idea of animal rights in particular, that constitutes an important and plausible alternative to the more familiar views advanced by philosophers in recent decades. (shrink)

The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...) the differences between the well-Known english writers on moral philosophy from sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." (staff). (shrink)

Someone once told me that the average number of readers of a philosophy article is about six. That is a particularly depressing thought when one takes into account the huge influence of certain articles. When I think of, say, Gettier's article on knowledge, or Quine's ‘Two Dogmas’, I begin to wonder whether anyone is ever likely to read anything I write. Usually the arguments of these very influential articles have been subjected to widespread analysis and interpretation. The case of Elizabeth (...) Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, published in 1958, is something of an exception. That article has played a significant part in the development of so-called ‘virtue ethics’, which has burgeoned over the last three decades in particular. But there has been less close attention to its arguments than one might have expected. (shrink)

One of the most persistent issues of contemporary moral theory is the possibility of inferring moral judgments from factual nonmoral judgments. Another way of stating this issue is to inquire into the possibility of inferring "ought-judgments" from "is-judgments." It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference was David Hume. The denial is supposed to be articulated in the last paragraph of the section of A Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Moral Distinctions not derived (...) from Reason," pages 469-470 in the Selby-Bigge edition. Hereafter I shall refer to this paragraph, the "is-oughtparagraph," as (I-0). The purpose of this article is to show that in (I-0) Hume makes no such denial, and to outline the implications of this revelation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 55-88.

The discussion of good and evil must not be confined to the sterile lecture halls of academics but related instead to ordinary human feelings, needs, and desires, says noted philosopher Richard Taylor. Efforts to understand morality by exploring human reason will always fail because we are creatures of desire as well. All morality arises from our intense and inescapable longing. The distinction between good and evil is always clouded by rationalists who convert the real problems of ethics into complex philosophical (...) puzzles. In the first part of Good and Evil, Taylor looks for a more meaningful conception by reexamining and rejecting the whole rationalistic tradition that dominates philosophical ethics. The second part provides an empirical explanation of good and evil, noting that one does not have to look too far to find prime examples of the failure of fixed moral rules. Including important commentary on Joseph Fletcher's groundbreaking situation ethics, and Aristotle's virtues (e.g., magnanimity and pride), Taylor rounds out the book by developing a philosophy of aspiration--personal worth as an ethical ideal--to replace the morality of duty. He offers a modified form of situation ethics to fit the contemporary problems we face. (shrink)

Samuel Pufendorf is one of the most important moral and political philosophers of the seventeenth century. His theory, which builds on Grotius and Hobbes, was immediately recognized as a classic and taken up by writers as diverse as Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Smith. Over the past twenty years there has been a renaissance of Pufendorf scholarship. On the Duty of Man and Citizen is Pufendorf's own epitome of his monumental On the Law of Nature and of Nations, and it served (...) as a basic text in European universities throughout the Enlightenment. This edition has a lucid and historically sensitive translation by Michael Silverthorne, the first since the early twentieth century. James Tully's introduction sets the text in its context, summarizes the main arguments, surveys recent literature on Pufendorf, and shows how Pufendorf transformed natural law theory into an independent discipline of juristic political philosophy that dominated reflection on politics until Kant. (shrink)

In this fresh evaluation of Western ethics, noted philosopher Richard Taylor argues that philosophy must return to the classical notion of virtue as the basis of ethics. To ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, ethics was chiefly the study of how individuals attain personal excellence, or "virtue," defined as intellectual sophistication, wisdom, strength of character, and creativity. With the ascendancy of the Judeo-Christian ethic, says Taylor, this emphasis on pride of personal worth was lost. Instead, philosophy became preoccupied with defining right (...) and wrong in terms of a divine lawgiver, and the concept of virtue was debased to mean mere obedience to divine law. Even today, in the absence of religious belief, modern thinkers unwittingly continue this legacy by creating hairsplitting definitions of good and evil. Taylor points out that the ancients rightly understood the ultimate concern of ethics to be the search for happiness, a concept that seems to have eluded contemporary society despite unprecedented prosperity and convenience. Extolling Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Taylor urges us to reread this brilliant and still relevant treatise, especially its emphasis on an ethic of aspiration. (shrink)

The distinction between good and evil is clouded by rationalists who convert the real problems of ethics into complex philosophical puzzles. Taylor develops a philosophy of aspiration -- personal worth as an ethical ideal -- to replace the morality of duty. Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

A major philosophical mind in his day, William Paley wrote in a lucid style that made complex ideas more accessible to a wide readership. This work, first published in 1785, was based on the lectures he gave on moral philosophy at Christ's College, Cambridge. Cited in parliamentary debates and remaining on the syllabus at Cambridge into the twentieth century, it stands as one of the most influential texts to emerge from the Enlightenment period in Britain. An orthodox theologian, grounding his (...) utilitarian ethics in strong religious faith, Paley held notably progressive views on issues of toleration and the slave trade. His perspicuity prompted one contemporary to remark that the book 'presents a subject which has always been considered as harsh and difficult, in the most agreeable and intelligible form … we sit down to be informed of our duty, and are surprised to meet with amusement'. (shrink)

The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) is a classic of nineteenth-century English jurisprudence, a subject on which Austin had a profound impact. His book is primarily concerned with a meticulous explanation of most of the core concepts of his legal philosophy, including his conception of law, his separation of law and morality, and his theory of sovereignty. Almost a quarter of it consists of an interpretation and defence of the principle of utility. This edition includes the complete and unabridged text (...) of the fifth (1885) and last edition. The comprehensive introduction discusses Austin's life, the main themes of his book, leading criticisms of his ideas, and recent interpretations of his legal philosophy. The edition also includes an up-to-date bibliography and biographical synopses of the principal figures mentioned in the text. (shrink)

The systematic relevance of the arguments Schopenhauer directs against Kant's categorical imperative has hardly been discussed in detail so far. As the difference between Kant's and Schopenhauer's moral philosophy amounts to the opposition between practical reason and sympathy, it is anything but surprising that it is reflected by Schopenhauer's objections. Schopenhauer tries to show that practical reason - be it in its pure or empirical form - is altogether incapable of furnishing a solid basis for ethics. To assess the import (...) of this thesis, a detailed examination of the aspects of practical reason that provoke Schopenhauer's critique is necessary including: 1) the identification of morality and reason; 2) the moral value of maxims; 3) the categorical imperative; 4) the prescriptive character of Kant's approach; and 5) his ethico-theology. Although some of Schopenhauer's arguments are based on misunderstanding, his interpretation of the categorical imperative as an expression of rational egoism seems convincing. /// A relevância sistemática dos argumentos que Schopenhauer dirige contra a doutrina kantiana do Imperativo Categórico quase não tern sido objecto de discussão. O autor do presente artigo considera que tal como a diferença entre a filosofia moral de Kant e de Schopenhauer se reduz à oposição entre razão e simpatia, não é motivo de surpresa verificar que ela está reflectida nas objecções de Schopenhauer. Este, com efeito, tenta mostrar que a razão prática - seja isso na sua forma pura ou na sua forma empírica - é totalmente incapaz de fornecer uma base sólida para a ética. Em ordem a captar a importância desta tese, o artigo propõe um exame detalhado dos aspectos da razão prática que suscitam a crítica de Schopenhauer, entre os quais se inclui necessariamente: 1) a identificação de moralidade e razão; 2) o valor moral das máximas; 3) o imperativo categórico; 4) o carácter prescriptivo da abordagem kantiana; e 5) a sua teologia ética. Muito embora alguns dos argumentos de Schopenhauer estejam baseados numa compreensão deficiente, o autor do artigo defende que a sua interpretação do imperativo categórico enquanto expressão de uma forma racional de egoismo parece convincente. (shrink)