The systematic relevance of the arguments Schopenhauer directs against Kant's categorical imperative has hardly been discussed in detail so far. As the difference between Kant's and Schopenhauer's moral philosophy amounts to the opposition between practical reason and sympathy, it is anything but surprising that it is reflected by Schopenhauer's objections. Schopenhauer tries to show that practical reason - be it in its pure or empirical form - is altogether incapable of furnishing a solid basis for ethics. To assess the import (...) of this thesis, a detailed examination of the aspects of practical reason that provoke Schopenhauer's critique is necessary including: 1) the identification of morality and reason; 2) the moral value of maxims; 3) the categorical imperative; 4) the prescriptive character of Kant's approach; and 5) his ethico-theology. Although some of Schopenhauer's arguments are based on misunderstanding, his interpretation of the categorical imperative as an expression of rational egoism seems convincing. /// A relevância sistemática dos argumentos que Schopenhauer dirige contra a doutrina kantiana do Imperativo Categórico quase não tern sido objecto de discussão. O autor do presente artigo considera que tal como a diferença entre a filosofia moral de Kant e de Schopenhauer se reduz à oposição entre razão e simpatia, não é motivo de surpresa verificar que ela está reflectida nas objecções de Schopenhauer. Este, com efeito, tenta mostrar que a razão prática - seja isso na sua forma pura ou na sua forma empírica - é totalmente incapaz de fornecer uma base sólida para a ética. Em ordem a captar a importância desta tese, o artigo propõe um exame detalhado dos aspectos da razão prática que suscitam a crítica de Schopenhauer, entre os quais se inclui necessariamente: 1) a identificação de moralidade e razão; 2) o valor moral das máximas; 3) o imperativo categórico; 4) o carácter prescriptivo da abordagem kantiana; e 5) a sua teologia ética. Muito embora alguns dos argumentos de Schopenhauer estejam baseados numa compreensão deficiente, o autor do artigo defende que a sua interpretação do imperativo categórico enquanto expressão de uma forma racional de egoismo parece convincente. (shrink)

The „petite éthique” which Ricoeur develops in Soi-meme comme un autre is distinctive in its way of paying attention to the individual, the other and the society all at the same time. For this very reason the problem of the distribution of social goods is fundamental. Ricoeur tries to solve this problem through a synthesis of teleological and deontological considerations, and here the approach of Rawls occupies a central place. On the one hand, the attempt to solve this problem in (...) the framework of a teleological approach draws on principles of justice which Rawls establishes through formal procedure; on the other hand, Rawls‘ position depends on a number of teleological presuppositions which are not compatible with his deontological approach. Ricoeur does not only attempt to refute Rawls, but to interpret his principles of justice as the result of a rationalisation of a sense of justice which is simply presupposed. (shrink)

The systematic relevance of the arguments Schopenhauer directs against Kant's categorical imperative has hardly been discussed in detail so far. As the difference between Kant's and Schopenhauer's moral philosophy amounts to the opposition between practical reason and sympathy, it is anything but surprising that it is reflected by Schopenhauer's objections. Schopenhauer tries to show is that practical reason be it in its pure or empirical form is altogether incapable of furnishing a solid basis for ethics. To assess the import of (...) this thesis, a detailed examination of the aspects of practical reason that provoke Schopenhauer's critique is necessary including: 1) the identification of morality and reason; 2) the moral value of maxims; 3) the categorical imperative; 4) the prescriptive character of Kant's approach; and 5) his ethicotheology. Although some of Schopenhauer's arguments are based on misunderstanding, his interpretation of the categorical imperative as an expression of rational egoism seems convincing. (shrink)

D’après Schopenhauer, Kant commet deux erreurs dans sa théorie de la causalité : 1) Schopenhauer reproche à Kant d’appliquer la catégorie de causalité à la chose en soi, ce qui est en effet incompatible avec sa thèse selon laquelle les catégories valent uniquement pour le monde comme représentation et non pas pour la chose en soi. Si, en outre, la chose en soi était une entité inconnue, on pourrait dire – conformément à Schopenhauer – qu’elle n’est pas capable d’« affecter (...) » le sujet et de produire de cette manière des données sensorielles. 2) Schopenhauer considère que, selon Kant, toute succession objective est une succession d’événements liés par la causalité. Bien que Schopenhauer ait raison de souligner que tout événement précédant un autre n’est pas la cause de ce dernier, sa critique n’est pas pertinente dans la mesure où Kant ne parle pas de la succession de deux événements, mais de celle de deux états d’une même chose. (shrink)