Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):319-346 (2011)
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Abstract

Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities

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Stephen Puryear
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

Why Leibniz Should Have Agreed with Berkeley about Abstract Ideas.Stephen Puryear - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (6):1054-1071.
Leibniz on Sensation and the Limits of Reason.Walter Ott - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2):135-153.

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References found in this work

The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (1):22-28.
Leibniz: determinist, theist, idealist.Adams Robert Merrihew - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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