Color objectivism and color projectivism

Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,985

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Color objectivism and color pluralism.Vivian Mizrahi - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
Color Experience: A Semantic Theory.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 67--90.
The data problem for color objectivism.Donald D. Hoffman - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):74-77.
Is color psychological or biological? Or both?Ernest Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:67-74.
Projectivist representationalism and color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color.Stephen Puryear - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):319-346.
Color, externalism and switch cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.
Constant colors in the head.James A. McGilvray - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):197-239.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
164 (#81,471)

6 months
5 (#168,645)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Allan Hazlett
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations