Neuroessentialism and the Rhetoric of Neuroscience

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (3):239-241 (2020)
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Abstract

At the very beginning of Lavallee’s article on addictive craving, they note that they will avoid using the term addict in an attempt to avoid essentializing the identities of people who experience addiction. Neuroscientific approaches to the study of mental disorders could benefit from a similar level of caution with regard to discouraging essentialism. Zachar characterized psychological essentialism as the “cognitive predisposition to view entities as possessing underlying natures that make them be the kind of things that they are”. The view that the brain is the underlying “essence” of the person has been dubbed neuroessentialism. Neuroessentialism entails that mental disorders have an inherent...

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