First-Person Neuroscience: A new methodological approach for linking mental and neuronal states

Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 1:3 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Though the brain and its neuronal states have been investigated extensively, the neural correlates of mental states remain to be determined. Since mental states are experienced in first-person perspective and neuronal states are observed in third-person perspective, a special method must be developed for linking both states and their respective perspectives. We suggest that such method is provided by First-Person Neuroscience. What is First-Person Neuroscience? We define First-Person Neuroscience as investigation of neuronal states under guidance of and on orientation to mental states. An empirical example of such methodological approach is demonstrated by an fMRI study on emotions. It is shown that third- and first-person analysis of data yield different results. First-person analysis reveals neural activity in cortical midline structures during subjective emotional experience. Based on these and other results neural processing in cortical midline structures is hypothesized to be crucially involved in generating mental states. Such direct linkage between first- and third-person approaches to analysis of neural data allows insight into the "point of view from within the brain", that is what we call the First-Brain Perspective. In conclusion, First-Person Neuroscience and First-Brain Perspective provide valuable methodological tools for revealing the neuronal correlate of mental states.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Acategoriality as mental instability.Harald Atmanspacher - 2005 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (3):181.
The Second-Person Perspective.Michael Pauen - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):33 - 49.
A matter of facts.DorothÉe Legrand & Franck Grammont - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):249-257.
Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic.Robert N. Audi - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
How to think about mental qualities.David Rosenthal - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
Searle's unconscious mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-03-19

Downloads
29 (#516,369)

6 months
7 (#328,545)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Georg Northoff
University of Ottawa

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.

View all 24 references / Add more references