The Case Against Affirmative Action

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):97-115 (1998)
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Abstract

Affirmative Action is becoming the most controversial social issue of our day. In this essay I examine nine arguments on the moral status of Affirmative Action. I distinguish between weak Affirmative Action, which seeks to provide fair opportunity to all citizens from strong Affirmative Action, which enjoins preferential treatment to groups who have been underrepresented in social positions. I conclude that while weak Affirmative Action is morally required, strong Affirmative Action is morally wrong.

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Louis P. Pojman
PhD: Oxford University

Citations of this work

Nonideal Justice, Fairness, and Affirmative Action.Matthew Adams - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3).
Racial Profiling And Cumulative Injustice.Andreas Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):452-477.
Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness.Marcus Arvan - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):208-228.
Affirmative action.Robert Fullinwider - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
II—Ideology and Normativity.Clare Chambers - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):175-195.

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