How to Determine whether Evolution Debunks Moral Realism

Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft Und Ethik 23 (1):35-60 (2018)
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Abstract

Anti-realist evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that if there were objective moral truths, then evolutionary evidence would suggest that our moral judgements are unjustified (which excludes or makes it unlikely that these truths exist). Recent controversies about these arguments can often be traced back to confusion about how its premises are to be supported or undermined. My aim in this paper is accordingly a clarificatory one. I will attempt to identify which kinds of philosophical or scientific evidence would have to be obtained in order to be able to properly assess evolutionary debunking arguments. It will emerge that philosophical inquiry can make a greater contribution than has often been acknowledged. Moreover, part of what makes these arguments so difficult to evaluate is that their philosophical and scientific aspects are very closely intertwined.

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Thomas Pölzler
University of Graz

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