Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):603-627 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. I first examine previous analyses of 'standing', and note these attempts all centre around the idea of entitlement. I then argue that thinking of standing to blame as a purely moral entitlement faces numerous problems. By examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame in partly metaphysical terms. That is, we should think of it as a status which grants agents the ability to do certain things. Using Darwall's (2006) account of second-personal obligations, I argue that we should think of blame as expressing demands. For these demands to impose obligations on others, however, we must first have the authority to make these demands. I argue that agents who lack standing to blame lack the authority to blame, and thus lack the ability to impose second-personal obligations on others by making these demands. They lack this authority because they fail to accept other people's second-personal authority to make similar demands on them.

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Author's Profile

Adam Piovarchy
University of Notre Dame Australia

Citations of this work

Explaining Loss of Standing to Blame.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-29.
Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame.Adam Piovarchy - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):514-538.
Let's See You Do Better.Patrick Todd - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.

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References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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